Five miles east of the big foothills guarding Pikes Peak’s 14,110 foot bastion lay the sprawling community of Colorado Springs. Though still not a large community in 1883, with only a few thousand residents, the “Springs” had as cosmopolitan a population as did many a larger eastern or midwestern city. This was due, in large measure, to the town’s exceptionally healthful climate.
The people of Colorado Springs spent much of their time commuting between their own city and the spa of Manitou Springs, five miles to the west. Midway between the towns was a dilapidated settlement which, in a moment of optimism, had been christened Colorado City.
Ute Pass lay just west of Manitou, its lower end a narrow, forbidding canyon walled in by dark granite cliffs. Fountain Creek dashed over the boulders studding the bottom of the gorge. Above the canyon, Ute Pass leads into a narrow mountain valley. Formidable as the pass might seem it had served as a natural gateway between the western edge of the Great Plains and the high country of the west. Ute Pass represented the only natural break in the front range between Platte Canyon and the Arkansas Valley-Royal Gorge gateway.
In the 1860’s, a wagon road of sorts was developed through the pass and over Hayden Divide. This road saw its most intensive use when Leadville developed after 1877. Traffic over this road all but died with the completion of the Denver South Park & Pacific to a point in South Park where it intersected the Weston Pass road in October 1879. The DSP&P continued building southwesterly through Trout Creek Pass towards a connection with D&RG near Buena Vista. On July 31, 1880, the Rio Grande’s track from Buena Vista to Leadville was completed and the Ute Pass wagon road sank back to a placid existence, providing an outlet to market for several lumbering firms in the region.
One such enterprise was located in what was know as Manitou Park; it manager a Colorado Spring resident named Homer D. Fisher. A staunch believer in cutting production costs through technological improvements, he constructed what was probably the first logging railroad in Colorado to get the logs from the cutting site to the mill. Still, one unresolved factor remained, transporting the finished lumber to market. Since a railroad had solved one transportation problem, why not one from Colorado Springs to his mill. It was this idea that led Fisher to conceive of the yet unnamed Colorado Midland as a standard gauge railroad.
Well aware that no railroad could be built without money, Fisher began beating the bushes for moneyed backers. Fisher found Henry T. Rogers, a Denver attorney and Thomas Wigglesworth, the locating engineer of the D&RG. Wigglesworth was sufficiently inspired by Fisher’s dream to make a preliminary survey through Ute Pass, and was satisfied in his own mind that a standard gauge railroad would be feasible.
This favorable engineering opinion was all that Fisher and his associates needed to convince them that the time had come to organize their company.
The Colorado Midland Railway had been born!
On November 23, 1883, Articles of Incorporation for the Colorado Midland Railway Company were filed in the office of Colorado’s Secretary of State. The incorporation papers provided that:
| First: The corporation name of said company is the Colorado Midland Railway Company. |
| Second: The object of said company is to locate, construct, operate and maintain a railway and telegraph line from the City of Colorado Springs in El Paso County through the Ute Pass into South Park and by the most eligible route to Salida and Leadville. |
| Third: The capital stock of the Company shall be $500,000, to be divided into 5,000 shares at $100 a share. |
During the following two years the company existed only on paper. Money, the essential element needed, was constantly on the thoughts of Homer D. Fischer and his associates during that time period. The first amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, filed April 2, 1884, provided that the Midland could also build a branch to Fairplay and Alma and the “mining districts adjacent to”. Amended again on October 7, 1884 to
| …Locate, construct, operate and maintain a railway and telegraph line from Leadville, Lake County, Colorado by the most eligible route to Aspen, Pitkin County, Colorado, and through Pitkin, Eagle, Gargield and Mesa counties to the western border of the State of Colorado with such branches as may be deemed necessary. |
In June 1885, the Midland directorate elected James J. Hagerman president. He went to work to get the railroad off paper and onto solid, standard gauge roadbed. Hagerman first planned the construction of the Colorado Midland westward out of Colorado Springs. Based on the lack of available funds, it was decided to build the Glenwood Springs-Aspen-Leadville section first and start hauling Aspen ore and Glenwood Springs coke and coal to Leadville. The revenues earned from this division would be utilized to finance the Colorado Springs-Leadville link and then on to Salt Lake City.
The idea of standard gauge competition thoroughly alarmed Denver and Rio Grande and the Union Pacific. Since the Midland would be totally dependent on them to bring construction materials to Leadville, they decided to prevent construction by doubling the rate for rail delivered to Leadville from $1.00 per 100 pounds to $2.00 per 100 pounds. This action so infuriated Hagerman that he gathered a group of eastern financial backers, themselves angered by the Union Pacific-Rio Grande extortion, and raised the money necessary to commence work on the Colorado Springs to Leadville, Glenwood Springs and Aspen trackage. Once completed, the road would push westward towards Salt Lake City.
The Construction Period . . . Top
On July 1, 1885 a construction company was incorporated under Colorado law as the Colorado Midland Construction Company to:
| Construct and equip those portions of the railway and telegraph line of the Colorado Midland Railway Company lying between the City of Colorado Springs and the City of Leadville, and between the City of Leadville and the mouth of Elk Creek on the Grand River, and between a point near the confluence of the Roaring Fork and Frying Pan Rivers to the City of Aspen, also to procure rights of way, depot grounds and other necessary lands, also to erect depot buildings, machine shops, roundhouses and other buildings therefor, and do all acts pertaining to locating, constructing, equipping and furnishing of said line of railway and telegraph between said points. |
The first construction contract was let April 5, 1886 to Orman, Crook & Company of Pueblo, Colorado and S.P. Meyer of Louisville, Kentucky. By mid-June, over a thousand men were at work hacking a grade out of the rocky flanks of Hagerman Pass, and boring over 2,000 feet of tunnel under the Continental Divide. This work was still under the mercy of the Rio Grande and South Park freight rates, so immediate action was taken to start work on the Eastern Division.
Chief Engineer Thomas
Wigglesworth had to scramble in unseemly haste to complete their surveys before
contracts could be let. By July of 1886, the final engineering locations were
made, and the contracting firm of Streator and McMurtrie placed over 1,000 men
at work on the Eastern Division. The Midland had moved fast, much too fast. As
a result of this haste, the road in many places was badly located, cost more to
construct and afterwards was expensive to operate. The operating and mechanical
headquarters was situated two miles west of the D&RG main line through
Colorado Springs, opposite Colorado City.
Reasonably high construction standards for the
middle 1880’s were adopted. Steel rail weighing 60 pounds to the yard was to be
laid in those portions of main line where grades and curves were severe, while 56-pound
steel was to be used in sections of milder topography, on all branches and in
many spurs and sidings. No tie plates were purchased which was to mean higher
track maintenance costs. Native red spruce ties were to be laid on tangents
with all heavy curves utilizing tough hardwood, principally oak. No ballast was
purchased as natural ballast from the country traversed was considered
adequate. Small and medium-sized bridges were to be of timber construction.
They were trestles, for the most part, plus a few wood through-truss
structures. Major bridges, and those crossing high rate of runoff watercourses
were to be of iron.
By December, 1886, track was laid for three miles
from the D&RG interchange past Colorado City shops and engine terminal to a
point one and one-half miles east of Manitou Springs. Grading was completed as
far as Lake George, 40 miles west. By March, 1887, track was down for 25 miles
west of Colorado Springs, just 1.9 miles east of Hayden Divide summit, and the
completed grade stretched all the way to Hilltop station (later Bath) at the
summit of Trout Creek Pass, 84.7 miles west of Colorado Springs. The 300-man
tracklaying crew was capable of laying ties and spiking down rail at a rate of
one mile per day.
The first regular train service was inaugurated on
July 13, 1887 after completion of the railroad to Buena Vista. In order to
handle existing and future business, the Colorado Midland purchased the most
modern equipment available. The first three locomotives, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, were
delivered by the Schenectady Locomotive Works in 1886. The operating officers
were aware that the Midland’s heavy grades meant locomotives of unusual size
and power for that era. Engines 1, 2 and 3, when delivered, were reputed to be
the largest Consolidation types (2-8-0) in the world.
In 1887, Schenectady delivered 25 more
locomotives. Seven were sister engines of the 1, 2, and 3 numbered 4 to 10.
Locomotives 11 to 22 were big Ten-wheelers, the heaviest and most powerful 4-6-0’s
yet built. Engines 11 to 14 were designed for freight service while Engines 15
to 22 were designed for passenger service. The 23 to 25 were lighter passenger
engines with three 0-6-0 switchers numbered 30, 31 and 32.
Passenger equipment consisted of open platform
cars 55 feet long and included 12 baggage cars, two combination cars, 12 first
class coaches, ten second class coaches and one suburban car. Most freight
equipment was of the 50,000-pound capacity and included 215 wooden flat bottom
gondolas, 25 stock cars and 325 box cars. There were also 110 flats of 40,000-pound
capacity and 16 cabooses.
On August 31, 1887 tracks
were laid into Leadville with passenger and freight service inaugurated the
following day. Steel was immediately pushed further west into the Sawatch Range
and the Continental Divide. The roadbed had been prepared earlier by the crew
working the Western Division. The Hagerman Tunnel, started in the summer of
1886, was completed on June 14, 1887. The tunnel was 2,060 feet long and pierced
the Sawatch Range at an elevation of 11,530 feet. The approach to this tunnel
was accomplished by means of four tremendous lariat loops including a huge
curved wooded trestle 1,084 feet long just at the beginning of the third loop;
a similar smaller trestle 420 feet long; and eight snow sheds.
By mid-September rail was spiked almost to Hell
Gate with much of the grading and bridge worked completed westward. On November
5, 1887 the Midland’s tracks reached Aspen Junction (Basalt) where the work
effort split. One group pushed the main line towards Glenwood Springs, while
the other worked on the 18-mile Aspen Branch. Regular train service began into
Glenwood Springs on December 18, 1887 after the completion of a large wooden
bridge over the Roaring Fork River. Construction of the iron Maroon Creek
viaduct and a wooden bridge over Castle Creek delayed the arrival of the
Midland trains into Aspen until February 4, 1888.
The coal lands in the Jerome Park near Glenwood
Springs were owned by the Midland under the name of the Grand River Coal &
Coke Company. Rail to this area was completed and placed in service by December
1887. By October 20, 1888 the main line had been extended westward to the coal
mining town of New Castle.
The year 1888 saw 13 more 4-6-0 freight engines
delivered. These included 26 to 28 from Schenectady, and 29 to 38 from Baldwin.
In addition, a rotary plow was obtained from Leslie Brothers Manufacturing
Company and two flangers from the Youngstown Car Company.
By the time trains were running into New Castle,
it became very obvious that the Midland was extremely expensive to operate. The
Aspen Short Line Railroad was incorporated on November 15, 1888 to construct a
new route from Snowden to a spot 3.8 miles west of Leadville at a place named
Arkansas Junction. This greatly reduced the grade on the original main line
through Leadville from 3% and 4% to 1.65%.
The Midland was now faced with the cost of
expanding the railroad westward into Utah. Although possible routes were
surveyed and permissions granted, the cost of $15,000,000. was the sticking
point. It was decided to push the Midland westward from New Castle down the
Grand Valley to Grand Junction. There the Colorado Midland would connect with
the Denver & Rio Grande Western, still an independent railroad. They were
quite will divide traffic equally between the Denver & Rio Grande and the
Colorado Midland.
Plans were made with the Rio Grande to grant the
Colorado Midland trackage rights between West New Castle (Gramid) and Rifle.
From Rifle a jointly owned line, the Rio Grande Junction Railway Company,
constructed the 64 miles of track to Grand Junction and the D&RGW
interchange. This effort was completed in September 1890 with standard gauge
trains running into Grand Junction by November 14, 1890 and connecting with the
now standard gauged Denver & Rio Grande Western.
Enter the Santa Fe
By the winter of 1890,
the Colorado Midland Railway had become a passenger and freight hauler. It had
been handling local traffic since early in the construction period. Now it was
a transcontinental link as well.
The Midland had its share of passenger traffic. In
addition to extensive local passenger hauling to and from Leadville, Aspen and
Grand Junction as well as the smaller communities served, there was
considerable through business. Astute advertising caused summer tourist traffic
to quickly become an important item in the Midland’s passenger travel picture.
Glenwood Springs, with its great hot springs, soon became one of the leading
tourist centers on the line. Large numbers of people also visited the mining
camps of Leadville and Aspen with transcontinental travelers contributing to
revenue via bridge traffic. Two through passenger trains were operated daily
with meals served at eating stations situated at Cascade, Arkansas Junction and
Basalt.
The Colorado Midland’s local freight traffic
picture was impressive. One of the largest single classifications was
bituminous coal from six mines on the Jerome Park Branch and in the New Castle
area, and coke from the ovens at Cardiff. Shipped via Midland gondolas, it was
consigned to metal mines at Leadville and Aspen, to smelters at Leadville and
Pueblo and many smaller communities both on- and off-line. Considerable
non-revenue tonnage was made up of company coal for Midland locomotives.
Coke tonnage was important with slack coal from
the Jerome Park Branch hauled to Cardiff and converted to high quality coke. It
was then loaded into box cars for shipment to Leadville, Pueblo, and copper
smelters in Montana.
Precious and industrial ores from Leadville and
Aspen was shipped to smelters at Denver and Pueblo, although some of
Leadville’s silver-lead was processed locally. Aspen’s silver-lead ore was
shipped in large volumes to the smelters at Leadville. In addition lime and
limestone from Thomasville, and high grade building stone from Peach Blow were
also shipped.
Woodland Park served the timber industry of the
Manitou Park area, Norrie and Thomasville with much of the lumber production
consisting of mining timbers for Leadville, Aspen, and Jerome Park. Livestock
was handled through Rifle and Hartsel with important loading points at
Florissant, Carbondale, De Beque, New Castle and Spinney. C.M. trains hauled
potatoes and other produce out of the Roaring Fork Valley and large hay tonnage
from South Park.
The principle inbound commodities included
processed foods, furniture, bricks and other building materials, explosives,
mining machinery and supplies, farm and ranch supplies and sawmill equipment.
With the Colorado Midland running into Grand
Junction, considerable bridge traffic had developed. Westbound bridge tonnage
consisted largely of manufactured goods with Eastbound loads mostly of lumber,
wheat and some perishables.
This through traffic necessitated additional
equipment. In 1889, the Midland purchased six Schenectady 4-6-0’s numbered 39
to 44. They also added 201 50,000-pound capacity gondolas and 16 60,000-pound
capacity wooded hopper cars built by the St. Charles Car Company. In 1890 four
additional 4-6-0s were obtained from Schenectady and numbered 45-48. In addition,
four baggage cars were obtained from Barney & Smith Car Company and 50 flat
cars, 100 wooded flat bottom gondolas and 200 box cars all of 50,000-pound
capacity and eight cabooses from the St. Charles Car Company.
Hagerman, although no longer the President but still a director, was disturbed by the heavy deficit of 1888, and the extremely small surpluses in 1889 and 18890. By May 1890, Hagerman had decided to attempt to sell the Midland to a large connecting railway to secure a good return on investment for the road’s financial backers. The Santa Fe was greatly interested in the Midland and in September 1890 took over control of the Colorado Midland. In fact, the Santa Fe operated the Midland as an owned subsidiary with only a small name change to Colorado Midland Railroad (from Colorado Midland Railway).
The Santa Fe, interested in the recent gold discoveries at Cripple Creek, decided to cash in on the new traffic possibilities from this area. In August 1892, the Midland Terminal was incorporated to tap this new traffic potential from a C.M. tie-in at Divide. Although originally started as a narrow-gauge line, the standard gauge Midland Terminal reached Victor in December 1894 and Cripple Creek itself just a year later. This tie-in greatly increased the Colorado Midland’s traffic volume. With large quantities of outbound ore and inbound freight of merchandise, lumber, mine timbers, coal and mining supplies adding to the traffic, two daily passenger trains were also added with through sleeper service to Denver.
Mr. Busk’s Tunnel
No one could deny that
the Colorado Midland crossing of the Continental Divide at Hagerman Pass was
spectacular. Though tourists and writers applauded this outstanding feat of
19th Century railway engineering, the Midland’s management was increasingly
unhappy about the high costs of running trains up and down 3% grades and around
the many 16-degree curves between Leadville and Basalt. Maintaining the
right-of-way was also expensive with the wild Hagerman Pass winters of howling
blizzards and roaring slides keeping the rotary outfit on the move from
November to March; tying up as many as six hard-working locomotives to shove
the Leslie plow through the snow. In addition, the high amounts of moisture
caused ties and bridge timbers to rot much more quickly than elsewhere on the
railroad.
As early as 1888, surveys were undertaken to
locate a long tunnel site at a lower elevation. Plans for this major line
relocation were completed in November 1889 and on June 16, 1890, the Busk
Tunnel Railway Company was incorporated. The total length of the Busk Tunnel
Railway was to be 2.9 miles. Its eastern end lay at Busk station where the
railroad began to reverse direction in the first great loop up the face of the
Sawatch Range. The western end was situated on the northern shore of Lake Ivanhoe.
The line was to be connected by a 9,394.7 feet tunnel under the Continental
Divide which become known as the Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel.
The Colorado Midland bondholders who were backing
the Busk Tunnel Railway Company secured a contract for its use from the Colorado
Midland Railway Company before construction was allowed to start. A toll of 25
cents per ton of freight and 25 cents per passenger carried through the tunnel
was agreed upon. This was necessary to raise the capital for construction of
the tunnel line estimated at $782,000.
The Colorado Midland, already burdened with a
tremendous debt load, did not wish to add to its indebtedness; moreover
financiers were more likely to invest in an independent tunnel company with an
assured income than to loan further sums to an already debt-burdened railroad.
This decision, although entirely logical at the time, would come back to haunt
the Colorado Midland in the not too distant future.
On July 25, 1890, the contract for digging the
tunnel was awarded to Keefe & Company of Butte, Montana. Starting the next
day, a small group of men with picks and shovels began excavating the approach
cut of the future west portal. While this work was going on, Keefe began hiring
men to drill the tunnel simultaneously from both portals and the CM set out
freight car loads of construction machinery at both the Busk and Ivanhoe
sidings.
No pumps were installed at the east end of the
tunnel as the bore was to descend a 1.4% grade from west to east. Since water
accumulation was going to be a big problem in the west portion of the tunnel,
three big pumps were installed. Muck was to be hauled out of the tunnel from
each heading over temporary narrow-gauge trackage with Keefe securing two
20-inch gauge Porter locomotives. Coke was used for fuel and not apparent
inconvenience was caused to workmen in the tunnel.
By September 15, 1890 all machinery was in place
at the Busk end and work commenced. Work on the Ivanhoe end didn’t start until
October 8, 1890, the very same day that the bench was started at Busk. The
bench at the Ivanhoe end finally got started on October 30, 1890.
The
tunnel was designed for single track operation and was to be 15 feet wide and
21 feet high. First to be drilled was the heading, which was 7 feet tall and
the full width of the tunnel. This was then followed by the bench. The gray
granite of the Sawatch Range had been found hard and firm in the old Hagerman
Tunnel, and it was supposed that it would be the same in the Busk-Ivanhoe. Such
was not the case and in order to protect the tunnel men, it was found necessary
to timber the breast of the working. In addition, the tunnel builders
encountered very large cavities in the rock filled with liquid mud which rushed
out and tried to bury the tunnel men when the cavity was breached. Last but not
least, water was always present.
By mid-July 1893, 8,473 feet of tunnel had been
completed, 4,660 feet on the Busk end and 3,813 at the Ivanhoe end. Then Keefe
tore up his contract. Three years of hard, frustrating work at two miles above
sea level, combined with the severe weather conditions of the Hagerman Pass
country, had seriously affected his health. It seems likely, also, that Keefe
had lost financially on the Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel contract.
Since only 921 feet of the tunnel remained to
excavate, the Busk Tunnel Railway Company took over the work. Arrangements were
made with Keefe & Company for the use of his work force and machinery. The
climax of this three-year tunnel building drama came on Wednesday October 18,
1893, when after 38 months of hard, grueling, dangerous labor, the tunnel
headings came together.
Two additional months were spent in applying the
finishing touches to the big tunnel, laying of track along the 2.9 mile
relocation, and installation of a signal system. On December 17, 1893, trains
began running through the bore under terms of the 999-year contract negotiated
in 1890.
The Busk Tunnel Railway’s 1.78-mile tunnel saved
the Colorado Midland $70,000 annually in maintenance of the old loop line. In
addition, use of the Busk-Ivanhoe tunnel made possible large savings in the
costs of running trains.
| Tunnel Line | Loop Line | Savings | |
| Distance | 2.9 mi. | 9.83 mi. | 6.9 mi. |
| Maximum elevation | 10,953.19 ft. | 11,528.31 ft. | 575.12 ft. |
| Rise and fall | 157 ft. | 1,307 ft. | 1,150 ft. |
| Degrees of curvature | 141 deg. | 2,099 deg. | 1,958 deg. |
It had been felt that since the west portal was 133 feet
higher than the east portal, the tunnel would be a natural chimney. Sometimes
this was the case, and the tunnel would be free of smoke and gas from 40
minutes to an hour after a westbound train entered the bore at Busk station.
The traffic flow often made it necessary for eastbound or westbound trains to
enter the tunnel before sufficient time had elapsed for the tunnel to clear. Strong
west winds or storms at Ivanhoe often prevented smoke and gas from escaping
from the tunnel, making the bore’s interior an inferno.
The Midland attempted to overcome the problem by
burning coke on the locomotives of all westbound trains between Busk and
Ivanhoe. This did not prove to be a cure-all and the coke burning experiment
was abandoned. Instead, when westbound trains stopped at Busk, the fireman
burned a good level bed of coal under the forced draft of blowers. As soon as
all engines had a heavy bed of smoke-free fire, the train passed through the
tunnel.
One Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel problem that the Midland
men did not have to worry about was collisions between trains. The Busk Tunnel
Railway was protected for most of its length by staff signal instruments.
Midland operating rules stated that only one train could occupy the block
section between Busk and Ivanhoe stations. The engineer of any train within
this block had to carry a staff or token withdrawn from the staff signal
instrument located inside the Busk and Ivanhoe station buildings. The two staff
instruments were electrically interlocked, and withdrawal of a staff from
either automatically locked both so that withdrawal of further staffs was
impossible. The machines remained locked until train reached the station at the
opposite end of the block, and the staff carried by the engineer was inserted
in the instrument at that station.
Although operations over the old loop line were
entirely suspended by January, 1894, all trackage and other facilities were
left intact as insurance against possible rockfalls, mud slides or similar
difficulties within the Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel.
Stumble into Receivership
From a financial standpoint, Santa Fe ownership and control
of the Colorado Midland was an unmitigated disaster. Whence came this disaster?
First and foremost from the crushing fixed charges which ate up all net income
until the Midland’s ledgers showed nothing but red ink; secondly from the
effects of a great local and national business depression.
Transcontinental bridge traffic in both directions between Colorado
Springs and Grand Junction poured dollars into the Colorado Midland coffers.
Even more so did traffic in ore, coal, livestock, lumber, mining machinery and
merchandise for local consumption. Passenger revenues further swelled gross
income. But neither dollars earned, nor dollars saved stayed in the treasury
very long when bond interest came due.
The Midland was unable to earn surpluses in times of prosperity and then
the great financial and industrial panic of 1893 struck. On June 26, 1893, the
mints of India, the world’s most important silver market, closed to the coinage
of silver. America’s monetary was then based both on gold and silver. Now with
silver bullion glutting the world markets and gold being hoarded, depression
struck America. Since Colorado was largely a silver mining state at the time,
the great panic’s effects were especially cruel here.
With national business activities partially paralyzed, through freight
traffic dropped off. Closing of mines at Leadville and Aspen slashed ore and
bullion tonnage. Coal mines in the Glenwood Springs area curtailed output
because of reduced demand from mining and smelting interests. Mine timber
production at Norrie and Thomasville dropped to a trickle. With so many people
without funds, passenger revenues declined. Only the Cripple Creek gold
traffic, interchanged between the Colorado Midland and the Midland Terminal
held up as gold mining was unaffected.
To make matters worse, the Midland’s parent road, the Santa Fe was
overextended, burdened with unprofitable subsidiaries, plagued by new fixed
charges and weakened by foolish rate wars with other railroads. Weakened as it
was the Santa Fe could not weather the Panic of 1893 and on December 23, 1893,
receivers were appointed for the railroad. When the February 1, 1894 interest
payment came due for the Midland, its treasury was empty, and it defaulted. On
February 2, 1894 the Santa Fe receivers were appointed receivers of the
Colorado Midland Railroad Company.
The Midland bondholders thought it prudent to take steps to protect their
investment and organized a committee who on May 1, 1894 got George W. Ristine
appointed receiver of the Colorado Midland Railroad Company and the Santa Fe
receivers discharged. Ristine was a professional railway administrator and
under his energetic yet careful guidance, the Midland began a comeback. He was
assisted by better economic times resulting in increases in bridge traffic and
a return of the summer tourist business. The mines in Leadville and Aspen began
to reopen to supply the base metals, lead zinc and copper as well as silver and
with base metal prices rising, mining enterprises could again make a profit.
Traffic of all types increased and with the discovery of rich gold veins
in the Leadville Mining District the Midland was in constant motion. Business
proved so good that a shortage of motive power and rolling stock developed. In
April 1896 this situation was temporarily relieved when the Midland Terminal
took delivery of five Schenectady-built 2-8-0’s and later 200 box cars. This
allowed several Colorado Midland 4-6-0’s to be returned from lease as well as
many box cars.
Receiver Ristine applied for and received permission to purchase five
Baldwin 2-8-0 freight engines, numbers 49 to 53, 180 Pullman-built box cars and
20 Hanrahan refrigerator cars. Because of reduced gross income resulting from
the June 19, 1896 Leadville miners’ strike and the small surplus, Ristine felt
that the Colorado Midland could not meet the coupons due on the Busk Tunnel and
Aspen Short Line bonds. Already unpaid since 1894 was interest on both the
First and Consolidated Mortgages so the U.S. Circuit Court of Denver on May 4,
1897 ordered foreclosure of the railroad under both mortgages.
The
foreclosure sales were held at Colorado City on September 8, 1897. The minimum
acceptance bid was set at $290,000 and by bidding just $5,000 more Henry T.
Rogers secured the entire Colorado Midland system. The Denver attorney was
acting as agent for the bondholder reorganization committee.
On October 11, 1897 the Colorado Midland Railway
Company was incorporated under Colorado law, it stated purpose being to:
| . . . purchase, maintain, operate and extend the lines of the Colorado Midland Railroad Company. |
The Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe no longer was represented on the Midland directorate, nor did it have any interest in the new company. Now reincorporated, reorganized, and with a more realistic financial structure, and with traffic again on the rise, the Colorado Midland prepared to play a more important role on the American railroad stage.
Tunnel Trouble and the Wild Winter of 1899
Though the Colorado Midland had seemingly made a fresh start,
more troubles arose almost immediately. The first came barely two days after
the September 8, 1897 foreclosure sale. Early on the morning of September 10th,
the Midland chalked up its worst accident, both in terms of lives lost and
property damage.
The accident just west of New Castle, on the
track used jointly by the Rio Grande and the Midland, was a direct result of
the loose methods too often used in 19th Century railroading. Rio Grande No. 506,
known a Passenger Train No. 1, and C.M. 22, known as Stock Extra 22, collided
0.6 miles west of Gramid. Number 22 was trying to beat No. 506 to Gramid and
miscalculated. The accident resulted in 16 persons killed, including both
engineers along with the wrecking of both engines, the Rio Grande head-end car,
smoker and coach, plus half of the stock cars in the Midland extra.
For some time, George Ristine had felt that the
rental for the Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel was much too high. Throughout the summer of
1897, Ristine tried to negotiate with the officers of the Busk Tunnel Railway
Company. Both sides soon “got their backs up” and issued simultaneous
ultimatums to each other. As a result, in September 1897, the Midland put crews
to work rehabilitating the Hagerman Pass “high line.” Four year of
neglect to this line made for a very difficult task. By the last week of
October, the “high line” was rehabilitated and ready for use. On
October 31, 1897, the Colorado Midland surrendered possession of the Busk
Tunnel Railway, and trains again labored over the “high line” loops.
All through the winter of 1897-1898 and the
following summer, the Midland kept pushing its trains over the old Hagerman
Pass line much to the surprise of the Busk Tunnel Railway Company. The onset of
the winter of 1898 failed to bring with it any warning of what lay ahead.
At night, on Tuesday, January 24, 1899 the storm
of all storms moved it. On Wednesday and Thursday, the snow fell with
ever-increasing intensity. Friday and Saturday so no respite and the rotary was
sent to work. After passing through Hagerman Tunnel, the rotary met an
eastbound livestock extra at Hagerman siding. The stock train immediately
started through the tunnel and down the east side, powered by three engines.
Upon reaching the second snow shed above Busk, the crew discovered that the
structure had collapsed under the tremendous snow load. The extra was trapped,
as the track behind the train had drifted shut.
A passenger train had struggled up the hill to
Busk and had gone in the hole to await the stock train. When it failed to
arrive, the passenger engine proceeded light up the hill cautiously. Upon
reaching the first snow shed the crew found that it, too, had started to
buckle. A further reconnaissance afoot revealed the collapse of the second shed
and the entrapment of the stock train. The engine managed to return to its
train at Busk, but drifts east of Busk made a return to Arkansas Junction
impossible.
Not long after the rotary had passed Hagerman, a huge snow
slide completely blocked the line. The rotary cleared the line to Sellar and
turned on the wye to attack the hill. The struggling rotary with her six
engines couldn’t get up the hill again as far as the slide.
The blizzard continued and a borrowed Jull plow from the Atchison Topeka
& Santa Fe arrived at Leadville on February 2nd. It immediately started to
the relief of the blockaded passenger train at Busk. Twenty-four hours after
leaving Leadville, the Jull arrived at Busk and freed the snowed in passenger
train. The passenger train backed down the hill to Arkansas Junction, turned on
the wye, and returned to Leadville.
On the western slope of Hagerman Pass the plow had been working near
Ivanhoe, but the tracks had drifted full behind it. The outfit was turned on
the Ivanhoe turntable and cleared the tracks to Sellar. With the rotary needing
mechanical attention and fuel supplies running low at Sellar, on February 3rd
the rotary retired to Basalt for repairs and crew rest. On the Busk side, the
Jull outfit continued to try and reach the first snow shed so it could be
repaired.
On February 5th the rotary left Basalt powered by five locomotives and
reached Sellar late that day. On the 6th disaster struck and through a miscommunication
between engineers because of the howling winds, the lead engine derailed and
damaged the drawbar to the rotary tender. With the tracks blown shut behind it,
the rotary was stuck.
The Midland managed to borrow another rotary which arrived at Leadville
just as the other rotary was getting disabled at Sellar on February 6th. The
Jull was replaced by the rotary on the east slope and the Jull was routed to
the west slope via the Denver & Rio Grande and arrived at Basalt on
February 9th. At the same time a new blizzard struck plugging the line between
Buena Visa and Leadville. The rotary working the east slope broke a large
casting as was trapped by the snow. A new part, weighting over 500 pounds, was
fabricated and through sheer gut and human muscle was carried via toboggans and
eight men on skis to Busk and on February 16th the rotary was hard at work
again on the east slope. About the same time the Jull plow liberated the
stalled rotary east of Sellar and with its’ repair, the unit backed down to
Sellar for refueling.
By February 18th, the rotary outfits on both sides of Hagerman were
working towards each other and by the 20th, the two snow fighting trains were
within seven miles of each other. The 21st ushered in a new blizzard and by the
following day, all the work so far had been undone. On the 23rd the storm ended
and the Jull which had return to the east slope broke through bringing coal and
supplies to the beleaguered crews. The Jull took over the fight while the
borrowed rotary made its way to the west slope to replace the Midland rotary
which returned to Leadville for necessary repairs.
By March 2nd the Midland rotary was again battling the drifts at Busk with
the Jull returned to Leadville and held as a spare. On March 5th the Midland
rotary reached the blockaded stock extra and pulled the train with its frozen
and lifeless cargo to Busk. The following day the worst blizzard yet undid all
that had been done and the rotary retired to Leadville for 24 hours until the
storm abated. By March 8th the storm had spent itself and the line was again
clear from Leadville to Busk.
During the following week and a half, good progress was made and the west
slope plow again was toiling above Ivanhoe while the Midland’s own rotary was
well up the hill above Busk. Rapid progress was now being made and on April
14th the two rotary teams met. The blockage had lasted 78 days!
After all this suffering and travail, the Colorado Midland and the Busk Tunnel Company began to consider reconciliation. In May of 1899, the Midland approached the Busk Tunnel Railway Company about an outright purchase and on May 12, 1899 the deal was completed and on May 26, 1899 trains again began running through the Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel. In the autumn of 1899, the dismantling train salvaged over ten miles of 60-pound rail, plus much usable timbers from snow sheds and trestles, finally closing the “high line” for good.
Under Two Masters
At the turn of the century, the United States was undergoing
an era of great prosperity and was experiencing an unprecedented business
expansion. The various railroad competed vigorously and sometimes bitterly with
each other, but with ample business all could prosper. The Midland’s through
business showed a desirable increase concurrent with the traffic between the
Nation’s industrial heartland in the east and the mining, agricultural and
lumbering areas of the west.
Ranching and stock raising had developed to the point where the Midland
urgently needed more stock cars to carry this traffic and became favorably
known by the ranchers as a “stockman’s railroad.” The coal business
from the Glenwood Springs field was also stimulated by heightened industrial
and domestic demands. Touring the West by rail was reaching its high point, and
Midland passenger receipts increased.
The Colorado Midland seemed set for a long period of prosperity, its
physical plant was in good shape and it is no surprise that neighboring
railroad, primarily the Colorado & Southern and the Rio Grande Western,
looked at the Midland as a possible takeover target. To avert a fight for
control of the Midland a syndicate was formed between the Colorado &
Southern and the Rio Grande Western to purchase the railroad. On July 2nd,
1900, control of the Colorado Midland was turned over to the C&S and RGW.
The Colorado Midland Railway still retained its own identity and individuality;
the principal change was simply that, instead of being owned by diverse eastern
investors, the railroad was now firmly in the hands of two of its principal
connections.
By December 1900, over $200,000 had been spent on new rolling stock,
improvements to roadbed, and extensions and additions. Of note was the
completion of the company program to convert all link and pin couplers to the
Janney automatic appliances. The 24 miles of line between Basalt and
Thomasville was realigned eliminating 30 to 40 sharp curves and compensating
others. The advantages gained by the Midland came in the form of reduced fuel
expenditures, faster upgrade train movement and decreased maintenance costs.
From the traffic standpoint, the most important betterment and extension
of 1900 was the construction of the Leadville Mineral Belt Railway which
increase the flow of ore traffic to Colorado Springs and then on to the Denver
and Pueblo smelters.
In the autumn of 1900, negotiations began with the Denver & Rio Grande
for control of the Rio Grande Western and by July, 1901, control of the RGW had
passed to the D&RG. The Colorado Midland was now half-owned by its
deadliest rival. Despite this fact, for the first few years of the 20th
Century, the Midland continued to prosper.
Two factors seem to account for this continued prosperity. In the first
place, the D&RG was not in good order at the time of the RGW purchase. The
railroad had barely enough freight cars to handle its own business over
mainline still laid with 65-pound rail utilizing engines purchase in the late
1880s. The second factor was the presidency of Frank Trumbull, one of the top
railway administrators of all time. Under his direction the Midland obtained
new traffic sources and made physical improvements which would permit more
efficient and economical operation.
In 1901, under his leadership the Midland purchased five Vauclain compound 2-8-0 locomotives from Baldwin. These locomotives were unusual Consolidations designed for dual service. They were numbered 201 to 205 and assigned the Colorado Springs-Leadville passenger service for the first few years of their lives. New 75-pound rail was laid from Lake George through Eleven Mile Canon to a point just east of Hartsel, and from Manitou to Cascade. During 1902, the Midland laid more 75-pound rail from Cascade up Ute Pass to just east of Divide. Between 1903 and 1906 additional 80 and 85-pound rail was laid. Rebuilding of motive power and rolling stock was also undertaken with older locomotives given modern, steel-sheeted cabs, electric headlights and generators and were otherwise altered. Additional service equipment was constructed from old revenue freight cars and those purchased after on-line accidents.
1907 marked the heaviest expenditures for improvements in any calendar year since 1901. Six heavy Consolidations were purchased from Baldwin. By using 301 to 306 in helper service and assisting compounds 201 to 205 to similar chores, the Midland was able to increase train loading on heavy grades. Also purchased were 100 gondolas of 80,000-pound capacity. A telegraphone system was installed throughout the main line, greatly facilitating train movements. Wood helper bents were installed in some iron viaducts in order to strengthen them for the 300 series 2-8-0’s.
The biggest single job of 1907 was the new Cardiff terminal. Since construction days, the second terminal west of Colorado City was located at Basalt, the first being Leadville; and Basalt was none too satisfactory, because the topography restricted yard room. At Cardiff, junction of the Jerome Park coal branch and site of large coke ovens, there was plenty of room. The Midland, after purchasing the necessary land at Cardiff, built a modern four-track, eight-stall engine house and coaling facilities, and laid out a large classification yard, then moved the division point to Cardiff from Basalt.
Receivership Again
Throughout this period,
from 1900 to 1908, the Midland was making money and with the exception of 1904,
posted financial surpluses in every year. Beginning in 1908, financial troubles
began, once again, to close relentlessly in upon the Colorado Midland. The
railroad found itself in a seemingly hopeless struggle against declining
traffic, absentee ownership and mounting debt.
The traffic decline was especially serious since
it deprived the railroad of revenue with which it might overcome the other two
problems. This decline began with a slide in the Midland’s through business.
The Rio Grande had poured a great deal of money into to its system such that by
1908 its capacity could handle all of its through business and tonnage was no
longer diverted to the Midland.
Local traffic was declining also. The Colorado
Fuel & Iron Company began closing its coking facilities in western Colorado
because new facilities had been built closer to the end users. In 1910 the
Cardiff ovens were permanently shut down The Spring Gulch Mine continued to
operate on a reduced basis for six more years supplying the Midland with
mine-run coal business consigned to mining and commercial firms as well as
domestic use. When the mine at Spring Gulch shut down completely in 1916, the
Midland lost a traffic source that once produced 1,000 tons of coal each
working day.
In 1911 the Midland lost its share of the Cripple
Creek ore business. The Cripple Creek Central Railway, the holding company
which owned the Midland Terminal and F&CC and ran the CS&CCD under a
management agreement, decided to back out of a traffic pooling agreement with
the Colorado Midland made in 1905. Since traffic pooling was not considered in
the public’s best interest, the CM had no legal recourse. At the same time the
Cripple Creek Central leased the CS&CCD, thus completely integrating the
Short Line into its compact little system. By using the newly leased railroad
for its main line, the Cripple Creek Central could haul ore on its own rails
all the way to the reduction mills at Colorado Springs and keep all the freight
charges instead of giving 40% of the tariff to the Colorado Midland on that
business going via Divide.
The closing of the
Thomasville limestone quarry and burning operation represented another cut in
revenue, although much smaller. The quarrying operation was moved to the firm’s
operation at Newett station on the Midland’s First District resulting in the
loss of over 150 cars of lime plus a few carloads of bulk stone each year from
this agency station.
Passenger traffic also began a slow decline. An
increasing number of automobiles were moving into the high country and the
state of Colorado began rebuilding the ancient, rutted wagon roads for use by
motorists. The automobile provided freight traffic to the railroad in the form
of autos, parts and tires and tank cars of gasoline consigned to dealers in
Leadville, Glenwood Springs and Grand Junction. The passenger traffic
department noticed a drop in passenger train receipts as automobile ownership
increased.
An old Midland enemy, funded debt, was again back
in the picture. Even in its most prosperous days between 1899 and 1907, the
railroad was chronically short of working capital. The Midland’s directors had
no choice but to place bonds upon the market, which sold well, but increased
the debt burden.
A change in the ownership picture also aggravated
the Midland’s plight. The Colorado & Southern Railway was purchased by the
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy in 1908. The Colorado & Southern was
purchased to round out James J. Hill’s railway empire. The Colorado Midland
and, for that matter, the narrow gauge South Park Division of the C&S merely
came along with the deal and were of no interest to Hill.
Frank Trumbull was replaced as president by
Burlington vice president Daniel Willard, a highly capable individual. Unfortunately,
Willard was only able to devote part of his time to the Midland’s problems as
his Burlington duties required much of his attention. In 1910 he moved on to
head the Baltimore & Ohio and general manager George Vallery took over as
president as well.
Despite the worsening financial picture, the
railroad spent what money it could for some further betterments. Vallery and
his predecessors knew that you had to spend money to make or save it, and the
Midland needed both increased business and reduced operating expenses. The five
Vauclain compound Consolidations were rebuilt to simple expansion locomotives.
A freight car rebuilding program was launched and,
by 1912, some 80 gondolas, 13 flats and 11 box cars had been rebuilt. The
upgraded freight equipment was more pleasing to shippers and cheaper to
operate. During this period the Midland realized that the automobile was here
to stay and A.V. Hunter, a wealthy Leadville individual, purchased for the
Midland car 6999, a steel underframe automobile car. He was later repaid for
his assistance. Improvements to roadbed were also made as finances permitted.
Though these betterment’s had increased
efficiency, sagging traffic and income made it ever more difficult for the
Colorado Midland to pay its bills and service interest on its funded debt.
In order to keep from going all the way over the
hill to the poorhouse, the management had to skimp on maintenance of the fixed
plant. Some dollars were saved, but deferred maintenance could mean many future
headaches for the railroad. The neglected condition of track and buildings was
observed in April 1916 by Assistant Chief Engineer Arthur Ridgway, of the
D&RG who was sent to check out the physical condition of the Colorado
Midland. Ridgway’s recommendations to improve the roadbed and arrest the
deterioration of the property fell on deaf ears.
Fortunately, the “down-at-the-heel”
condition of the fixed plant did not extend to the rolling stock. The
locomotives were kept in fine mechanical condition, as were the passenger and
freight cars. Freight equipment, however, had begun to look quite shabby since
it was seldom repainted after 1912.
After reviewing the operating figures for the 1915-1916 fiscal year, Vallery decided that the Colorado Midland’s best hope was to affect a reorganization which would scale down indebtedness and provide funds for improvements capable of cutting costs and attracting new business. However, the security holders were a stubborn lot and apparently dragged their feet. Finally, some creditors lost both patience and hope, and demanded that the property be sold at foreclosure for what it might bring. On February 12, 1917 a decree of foreclosure against the Colorado Midland Railway Company was entered in Federal District Court in Denver under the First Mortgage of 1897. April 21st was set as the date for the sale unless a reorganization plan could be approved by a majority of the bondholders prior to the sale date.
Work on a reorganization plan proceeded energetically, and by mid-March a plan was submitted to the bondholders for approval. Receiver Vallery pointed out that it was an excellent plan and recommended acceptance by the bondholders. He believed that the Colorado Midland’s future looked good. Unfortunately, in the next weeks, the amount of bonds deposited, and payments made were not sufficient to enable the planned reorganization to be carried out and the plan had to be abandoned.
Mr. Carlton to the Rescue
When the April 21st date
arrived, a group of junk dealers were amassed in the Colorado City yard. However,
when the bidding had concluded, Albert E. Carlton had purchased the entire
Midland property for $1,425,000. Carlton seems to have three motives behind his
purchase of the railroad. One was sheer altruism; the Colorado Springs
millionaire and his associates felt that the loss of the Midland would injure
their beloved city, whereas a revived Colorado Midland would benefit the
community economically. The other two motivating influences were based solely
on the old-fashioned profit motive. For one thing, Carlton felt that the
Colorado Midland could be integrated into his industrial and financial empire to
the mutual benefit of all the companies involved. For another, he was certain
that a rejuvenated Colorado Midland could turn out to be a worthwhile
investment for its own sake.
Putting his plans into motion, on May 31, 1917,
the Colorado Midland Railroad Company was incorporated as the first step to put
the railroad on a firm legal and financial footing. Carlton announced to the
press that a complete physical rehabilitation of the Midland property was to be
affected. Improvements of the railroad would permit faster schedules and better
service.
Traffic development got underway immediately.
Effective July 31, 1917, all Cripple Creek ore traffic was diverted from the
Cripple Creek Short Line, controlled by Carlton, to the rails of the Midland
Terminal and Colorado Midland. Carlton also acted vigorously to bolster the
Midland’s coal traffic. The Rocky Mountain Fuel Company, at Carlton’s
persuasion funded new machinery for three of its mines along the Midland. Since
America had entered the war in Europe the same month Carlton bought the
railroad, demand for fuel was great and the coal firm’s improvements resulted
in much heavier coal movements over the Midland.
The railroad’s new owner also gave special
attention to the competitive situation at Grand Junction. By mid-summer, 1917,
Carlton had signed a contract with the Santa Fe under which the big
transcontinental agreed to supply all the Santa Fe Refrigerator Dispatch cars
the Midland would require eliminating the chronic shortage of ART refrigerator
cars. For its part, the Midland agreed to turn over all unconsigned cars of
fruit to the Santa Fe at Colorado Springs.
Desirable as were these increases in local hauling,
the new management realized that through traffic must be stimulated in order to
make the Midland truly profitable. Thanks to Carlton’s control of the Holly
Sugar Corporation, the cars were now route from the California sugar factory to
Grande Junction and then over the Midland to Colorado Springs. Not only did the
Midland get from one to several eastbound cars of Holly sugar daily, but the
railroad had control of them, and could bargain for westbound bridge traffic
with the connecting roads at Colorado Springs. This strategy provided the CM
with a healthy increase in through tonnage.
Betterment’s were soon
forthcoming. Several thousand tons of 90-pound rail, enough to relay 40 miles
of track, were ordered including tie plates. This was installed in the fall of
1917 to replace battered and worn 60-pound rail. New zinc-treated oak ties were
obtained along with a modern ditcher purchased second hand from the Cripple
Creek lines.
Two modern trestle-type coal chutes were built at
the Colorado City engine terminal and at Basalt. The division point for freight
crews was moved from Leadville to Wild Horse to eliminate problems with the
16-hour law in the First District. Passenger crews were still stationed at
Colorado City, Leadville, and Cardiff.
In order to augment the dwindling freight car
supply, the C.M. bought 119 secondhand freight cars from the defunct Denver
Laramie & Northwestern. Though secondhand, these cars were almost new and
were equipped with many modern features as steel underframes and cast steel
trucks. Motive power additions would have to wait until after the roadbed was
in shape to safely bear the weight of larger locomotives. Orders were placed,
though, for additional 9-1/2 single air pumps, in order to give some
locomotives two such units, and also for 8-1/2 cross-compound air pumps so that
the locomotives could handle more tonnage on the steep 3% and 4% grades.
President Carlton began coordinating operations of
the Cripple Creek Central with those of the Colorado Midland since he controlled
both systems. Motive power of all the railroads was pooled for maximum
efficiency, along with passenger and freight equipment. The C.M. dispatchers at
Colorado City now handled all dispatching for the various railroads. All
maintenance and repairs were centered at the Colorado Midland shops. For all
intents and purposes, the Colorado Midland and Cripple Creek Central were being
operated as a single unified railroad system.
The plans of President Carlton and the rest of the
board of directors went beyond traffic development and physical rehabilitation.
They planned to extend the railroad to Salt Lake City. It was felt that this
extension would increase access to a far greater volume of local traffic, would
extend the hauls for through business, and gain access to the Utah Copper mine
business. Plans were formulated on path the railroad would follow from Grand
Junction to Provo, Utah. In fact, negotiation were underway to purchase the
Uintah Railway and re-gauge it to standard gauge. The final leg of the journey
to Salt Lake City was still under discussion when in the autumn of 1917,
America’s railroads were facing a crisis brought about by poor logistics in the
movement of military supplies to support the war in Europe. As a result,
President Wilson, on December 26, 1917 issued a proclamation forming the United
States Railroad Administration to exercise over-all control of American
railroads. The U.S.R.A. had the right to control all traffic routing, in order
to facilitate military and civilian traffic and to relieve congestion. This
thus gave the U.S.R.A life-and-death power over all railroads.
Death Comes to the Midland
Early in January 1918,
the United States Railroad Administration, was struggling to undo the
transportation mess created by the military services. Traffic solicitation
offices were abolished, established movements of goods were changed, and in
some cases, loads were sent one way, empties another. Disorganized confusion
was converted into organized chaos.
The U.S.R.A. did perform some very useful tasks
such as the U.S.R.A. locomotive design standards and the policy of routing
traffic via alternate and less heavily traveled railways. It even managed, on
occasion, to move all traffic over the shortest route whenever practical.
Since, on paper, the Colorado Midland offered a
route across central Colorado that was appreciably shorter than the Denver
& Rio Grande, a great deal of war traffic was diverted over the C.M. The
handling of troop trains was something different for the C.M. where passenger
trains averaged five or six cars. Troop trains of as many as twelve or fifteen
cars created new problems and the severe winter of 1918 further complicated the
problem with necessity of heating those longer trains.
As difficult as the troop movements were to
handle, the inrush of freight traffic threatened to choke the railroad. If the
Carlson improvement program had been further advanced, the Midland could have
handled this increased traffic without undue difficulty. Unfortunately track
and roadbed rehabilitation were only partially completed, and no new motive
power had been ordered pending studies of locomotive possibilities. The traffic
now available exceeded the C.M.’s current capacity.
In an effort to break the developing traffic
bottleneck, the Midland General Manager decreed that the maximum tonnage limits
should be raised from 950 tons to 1100-1500 tons with no increase in
locomotives per train. In theory if a locomotive could handle a certain tonnage
up a 3% grade at 15 or 20 miles an hour, it ought to be able to handle a third
again at half that speed. In practice, this policy increased the growing
congestion rather than alleviating it. The slower train speeds meant that
Helper engines were tied up on the road for longer periods of time. Thus, when
new trains arrived for a Helper, they had to wait. The Midland was grinding to
a halt.
In order to get things
moving a little better, the management reshuffled the available motive power,
taking full advantage of Midland Terminal and Cripple Creek Central equipment
The power shuffle helped, but it was not a cure. The General Manager obtained
permission to borrow a Denver & Salt Lake 2-6-6-0 Mallet compound
locomotive for test purposes, but it was feared by some that these large
locomotives would overtax the Midland’s partially rehabilitated track. As an
alternate approach the Midland’s Chief Mechanical Engineer began drawing up
plans for 15 heavy 2-8-0 locomotives. These locomotives substantially exceeded
the fine 300 series engines in both size and power yet would not strain the
partially rehabilitated track.
Loaded cars consigned to the Colorado Midland by
the U.S.R.A. were arriving at both Colorado Springs and Grand Junction faster
than they could be moved over the C.M. and the congestion increased. In a
desperate effort to alleviate yard congestion, strings of cars were moved from
the two yards to various passing sidings along the mainline. This action
further delayed over the road traffic as meets became more difficult and the
need to perform time consuming saw bys increased. Derailments became more
frequent.
Already aware that things were not going well on
the Colorado Midland, the U.S.R.A began checking more closely into the
situation. As a result of this investigation, in late May 1918, the U.S.R.A.
notified the C.M. that effective immediately all traffic allocated to the C.M.
was to be rerouted via the Denver & Rio Grande. Even though the D&RG
had a longer route, it was felt that its superior equipment, profile and
alignment would permit the traffic to be handled in a more satisfactory manner.
Carlton tried in vain to modify this decree, but to no avail.
Although Carlton still managed to increase local
traffic on the Midland, it soon became more and more obvious that without
bridge tonnage, the railroad couldn’t survive. Fearing loss of its equity in
the Midland, The Colorado Title and Trust Company applied in District Court in
Colorado Springs for a Receiver to be appointed to oversee railroad operations.
In the first week of July 1918, Bert Carlton was appointed as receiver and
ordered to stop operating the railroad on or about August 5, 1918.
Carlton
was now reconciled to closing down the Midland for the duration of the war.
None of the parties involved wanted to junk the property and they were hopeful
that once the war ended, service could be resumed. An appeal was submitted to the
Colorado Supreme Court requesting that the dismantling portion of the District
Court’s dictatorial order be set aside. In the meantime, permission was
received from the Colorado State Railroad Commission and the Interstate
Commerce Commission to suspend service. On August 4, 1918, the last regular
passenger train left Grand Junction with engineer W.P. Bates at the throttle,
the same man who had brought the first Midland train into the city in November
1890! The train arrived in Colorado Springs the morning of August 5, 1918,
ending 31 years of passenger service.
Freight service continued for five more days
moving delayed loads, empties, and cripples into Grand Junction and Colorado
City terminals. Traffic still continued out of Colorado City for the Cripple
Creek Central and the C.M. main line east of Divide.
On September 17, 1918 the dismantling order was
set aside by the Colorado Supreme Court. The Colorado Midland still had a
chance to come back from the dead. But could it?
After the November 11, 1918 armistice, Carlton
and the directors began to have second thoughts themselves. The Midland Family
was mostly scattered or retired. If they couldn’t do it alone, maybe the
Midland might be a useful addition to a larger connecting road. Feelers were sent
out to the Rock Island, the Colorado & Southern and the Atchison Topeka
& Santa Fe, but only the Santa Fe showed any interest.
In the meantime, even though the Midland wasn’t
running any trains, it still had an income.
| C.M. freight cars were being used on a per diem basis by other railroads. |
| The Midland Terminal Railway was paying the C.M. for trackage rights between Colorado Springs and Divide and for use of the Colorado City yard and engine terminal. |
| Colorado City shops were busy repairing Cripple Creek rolling stock. |
| Additional income was being received from the sale of ice from Lake George. |
| The Denver & Rio Grande was running trains from Wild Horse to Newett limestone quarry and from Funston yard (Glenwood Springs) to the coal mines on the Jerome Park Branch. The Colorado Midland shared in these traffic receipts. |
The Santa Fe, had it purchased the Midland,
doubtless planned to relay the entire line with 90-pound steel, rebuild all
bridges to Santa Fe standards, and support equipment requirements from its own
system’s vast motive power and rolling stock pool. Because the Santa Fe was
interested solely in the Midland’s fixed plant, Carlton began to sell the
Midland’s own locomotives, passenger cars, and unused freight equipment
producing additional income.
Though
the Santa Fe engineers, and operating people had been favorably impressed by
the possibilities of the Midland as a feeder division and possibly a first big
step towards Salt Lake City, higher authority was not entirely convinced. Top
management of the Santa Fee finally decided against acquisition of the Midland
early in November 1920.
Although the Colorado State Railroad Commission
had, by now, granted Carlton the right to junk the railroad, he hesitated. In
the lingering hope that some other carrier might purchase the railroad, Carlton
delayed scrapping the C.M. for another seven months. Finally, in the early
summer of 1921, Carlton reluctantly ordered dismantling to begin early in July.
With eight of the Midland’s locomotives still unsold, more than adequate motive
power remained to complete the task.
With one exception, Carlton deeded the
right-of-way to the State of Colorado for highway purposes. Consequently, only
the rails and fastenings were salvaged; all wooden and metal bridges were left
in place. By the spring of 1922, all physical assets were sold, including the
Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel. The only section of right-of-way not given to the State,
the tunnel was sold to a newly created Carton company, the Busk-Ivanhoe
Corporation. All the company’s debts were discharged, and, at the last
directors meeting, April 28, 1922, the final liquidating dividend was declared
out of money received from the sale of physical assets giving the investors,
ultimately, 135% return on their investment. Thus, in its death, the Colorado
Midland finally provided the big profits that James J. Hagerman had expected it
to pay in its lusty infancy.
The Colorado Midland Railway Company was legally dissolved on May 21, 1922
By penetrating the Colorado Rockies with the
first standard gauge railroad in the region, the Colorado Midland stimulated
the economic development of that rich territory. The development was further
accelerated by the standard gauging of much of the Denver & Rio Grande; it
must be remember, however, that it was the threat posed by the Midland that
forced the Rio Grande to take this action.
The Colorado Midland has become the hobby of
increasing numbers of people throughout the Western World. Thus, we have the
ultimate triumph of the Colorado Midland that in dying, it achieved immorality.
THE END